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THE LEGAL RELATIONS OF CITY AND STATE WITH
REFERENCE TO PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION
By HAROLD F. KuwMi*
EXTENT OF THE COMMISSION'S CONTROL OVER FRANCHISES
III
N a preceding section we sought to determine to what extent
the federal constitution will protect a municipal corporation, in
its ownership of public utilities, against the state. In that connec-
tion we examined a number of federal and state cases and con-
cluded that the city, when acting in a proprietary capacity, was
entitled to a considerable degree of protection under the contract
and due process clauses of the constitution. It is now our object
to see whether the fixing of rates by a state public service commis-
sion is an impairment of such municipal rights.
The particular provisions under which the city most often claims
contract rights are usually embodied in a franchise agreement. It
will therefore be necessary to inquire briefly into the nature of
franchises. During the first half of the nineteenth century, it was
customary to grant them their privileges by special act of the legis-
lature. As might be expected, such a system was subject to abuse,
and during the latter half of the century there was a tendency to-
ward incorporation under general laws, with the franchises to be
obtained from the local councils.1 Thus a great number of existing
franchises are the result of municipal grants.
A franchise has been defined as "a particular privilege which
does not belong to an individual or corporation as of right, but is
conferred by a sovereign or government upon, and vested in, in-
dividuals or a corporation."' The following have been held to be
franchises: the right to construct and operate a street railway ;'
right to construct and maintain a public bridge;' or a ferry;' right
*Instructor, Department of Political Science, University of Minnesota.
Continued from 6 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEw, 32.
'King, The Regulation of Municipal Utilities 78-80.
23 Dillon, Municipal Corporations 19o6.
'Joyce, On Franchises, 42.
'Ibid P. 43. "Ibid p. 45.
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to dig in the streets of a city or town to supply the inhabitants with
water;* or with gas ; right to use the streets for the purpose of
transmitting electricity. It is a generally accepted principle that
such a grant when accepted and acted upon by the grantee becomes,
as to him, a contract within the meaning of the federal constitution.
Because of this, the regulation of public utilities is accompanied by
constitutional questions, which must be investigated. We may sup-
pose the city has granted to a private corporation the right to sell
water to its inhabitants, for a certain specified rate, and under cer-
tain conditions. On the establishment of the state commission ques-
tions will arise as to the commission's power to regulate the rates
and services stipulated for by such agreement.
It is essential that the franchise be a grant from a sovereign au-
thority, and in this country none are valid unless derived from a
law of the state.' But while the state may make the grant directly,
it is equally competent for it to delegate this power to a municipal
corporation." That in every instance the privilege is to be con-
sidered as originating with the state is shown by the fact that the
state may grant a public service corporation the use of a city's
streets without the consent of the city and even against its will."
Nor need it make any compensation to the municipality for such
concession." It is true that the general practice has been to allow
the city a voice in the granting of such rights. But while this may
have led some courts to regard the franchise as emanating from the
municipal corporation, it must be kept in mind that the city is here
acting as the agent of the state, and that any municipal authority in
this matter "is purely derivative and must flow from the legislative
fountain.""
Since the city in the granting of true franchise pfivileges is
acting merely as the agent of the state, for the purposes of govern-
ment, it is evident that it cannot get a vested right in such powers




'Dartmouth College v. Woodward, (189) 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 518, 4 L.
Ed. 629.
"Bank of Augusta v. Earle, (1839) 13 Pet. (U.S.) 519, 595, io L. Ed.
274.
"Joyce, Franchises 261-62; L. R. A. I9i8D 315 note.
".3 Dillon, Municipal Corporations 1915 6, 1932, 2137.
"City of La Harpe v. Gas Co., (igo4) 69 Kan. 97, 76, Pac. 448.
"3 Dillon, Municipal Corporations 2140. "The source of a franchise
is the state whatever the agency employed." Joyce, Franchises 239.
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the grant of those privileges which do not belong to any citizen
as of common right but can come only through a grant from the
sovereign; and is not used, as in the popular sense, to mean all those
various provisions that appear in the document that sets forth the
agreement between city and company. The grant of franchise
rights is a purely governmental function, but the -agreement may
contain in addition various provisions made in a proprietary capac-
ity. As noted in a preceding section, the city's purely govern-
mental powers are held at the will of the legislature. There would
consequently be no difficulty in the state resuming the franchise
granting power in order to place it in the hands of a public service
commission. Neither should there be any difficulty in the state
giving up governmental benefits derived by the municipal corpora-
tion from previous contracts, for in the final analysis the agree-
ment is not between the city and company but between the state
and the company. If the state foregoes benefits which the muni-
cipality has gained under the contract, it is merely giving up that
which has been gained for it by its agent, the city. Though the
municipal corporation may have private rights beyond the reach of
the legislature, it has no such governmental privileges. Hence the
principle that a franchise when acted upon becomes a contract must
not be so interpreted as to include powers exercised by the city as
governmental agent of the state.'
But it has been suggested that the franchise agreement, using
that term in its broadest sense, may include private as well as pub-
lic provisions; that though made by the city primarily in its govern-
mental character, the agreement may incidentally contain stipula-
tions of a private nature. The city has exercised each of its dual
capacities in a single franchise contract, acting in one character
with respect to certain matters, and in a different character with
respect to others. It is often a matter of great difficulty to deter-
mine in what capacity a particular provision has been made. Con-
sider, for instance, a franchise stipulation for free water for the
city. McBain is of the opinion that this right should be zegarded
as a proprietary one, if any is. The court's refusal so to regard it
is cited by this writer as additional proof of his contention that the
city is entitled to no protection under the contract clause while
'3An exception to this principle exists in a particular class of cases
where it has been held that the power to fix rates may be suspended for
a term of years, as will be brought out later.
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engaged in a private undertaking' But it is to be observed that in
incorporating this provision the municipality is seeking to further
its governmental rather than its proprietary interests. The water is
to be used mainly, if not wholly, for fire and street purposes and in
buildings held in a public capacity such as the city hall, hospitals
and the city schools. The public service commissions have found
no trouble in ordering payment in such cases. Their decisions,
however, are generally based on the ground that free water for
cities is a form of discrimination in that a public burden is placed
on resident users only, rather than on the whole public."
The case of Chicago v. O'Connell' indicates the nature of the
provisions which may be regarded as establishing proprietary
rights. Here the court was considering the rights accruing to city
and street railvay under an ordinance of the city of Chicago. In its
opinion the court says:
"Appellees contend, however, that the settlement ordinances,
having been accepted and acted upon by the railway companies, con-
stitute. binding contracts between the city and the railway com-
panies, and that their obligation cannot be impaired by any act of
the legislature or by any act of the State Public Utilities Commis-
sion. Appellee's contention is undoubtedly sound so far as the con-
tracts relate to matters which do not affect the public safety, wel-
fare, comfort and convenience. Thus . . . the agreement to
divide the net receipts between the railway companies and the city
and the option given to the city to purchase the railway properties
at a certain price are all matters which do not affect the public
safety, welfare, comfort or convenience, because it is immaterial
to the public what person or corporation operates the street rail-
ways, or what disposition is made of the profits and over these
matters neither the State nor the State Public Utilities Commission
has any control by virtue of the police power."
Thus the same franchise may contain both public and private pro-
visions. As we have seen the public are held wholly at the will of
the state, but in its private rights the city has a considerable degree
of protection. We are now prepared to examine the rate stipula-
tions commonly included in franchises, to see whether the city
has there any right which is entitled to constitutional protection
against the activities of the state public service commission. It may
"See article by H. L. feBain in 3 Nat. Mun. Rev. 284.
"Town of Hollister v. Hollister Water Co., (1915) P. U. R. I915D 626
(Cal.) ; Borough of East Pittsburgh v. Pennsylvania Water Co., (1919)
P. U. R. i9iF 631 (Pa.); Re Charles Town Water Co., (1gi6) P. U. R.
I9i6D 725 (W. Va.); Re Warwood Water & Light Co., (1917) P. U. R.
1917C 329 (W. Va.).
"Chicago v. O'Connell, (1917) 278 Ill. 591, 116 N. E. 210.
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be that the agreement fixes a certain rate as the only one to be
charged during a fixed period. On the establishment of a state
commission with the power to regulate rates the question naturally
arises, has that body the power to alter the rate in such a case as this
where the period has not yet expired? The answer so far as the
city is concerned must depend on one or both of the following ele-
ments: (1) on the nature of the power to regulate rates; (2) on
the capacity in which the city entered into the rate-fixing agreement.
The regulation of rates is an exercise of the police power of the
state. This broad power is not limited in its application to regula-
tions in the interest of the public health, morals or safety, but ex-
tends as well to those which are designed to promote the public
convenience, or general welfare or prosperity." Since the regula-
tion of public utility rates is for the public convenience and general
welfare, such rate-fixing must be deemed a proper exercise of this
power." It is one of the great sovereign rights of the state. It may
be delegated to a municipal corporation,2 but since the power is
governmental, it must in such case be exercised directly by the
municipality, and cannot be further delegated.'
It is well settled that ordinary contracts are subject to an
exercise of the police power, that the prohibition against their
impairment does not prevent the state from exercising this great
power. This must be so when we consider that the power is a
governmental one and of a continuing nature. Private persons
cannot by contract between themselves limit the exercise of such
a function. Rather, their agreements are supposed to have been
made with reference to a probable change than an exercise by the
state of a continuing power. Accordingly, contracts between pri-
vate consumer and public utility which lay down a certain rate for
a definite period are subject to change by the commission, even
though the period named therein has not yet expired.!'
"Chicago, etc., Ry. v. Drainage Commissioners, (1905) 200 U. S. 561,
592, 50 L. Ed. 596, 26 S. C. R. 341; Chicago and Alton R. v. Tranbarger,
(1914) 238 U. S. 67, 77, 59 L. Ed. 12o4, 35 S. C. R. 678.
"Mill Creek Coal and Coke Co. v. Public Service Comm., (1919) 84
XV. Va. 662, IOO S. E. 557, P. U. R. 192o A 704; Freund, Police Power 19o4,
sec. 555.
"3 Dillon, Municipal Corporations 22-26 note; Joyce, Franchises 263.
"3 Dillon, Municipal Corporations 2233.
"Manigault v. Springs, (905) 199 U. S. 473, 26 S. C. R..127, 5o L. Ed.
274; 6 R. C. L. 199.
"Pinney and Boyle Co. v. Los Angeles G. and E. Corporation, (1914)
168 Cal. 12, 141 Pac. 62o, L. R. A. 1915C 282, and note; Minneapolis, etc.,
R. Co. v. Menasha Wooden Ware Co., (1914) 159 Wis. 130, 15o N. W.
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If private persons cannot through agreement tie up the exercise
of the rate-making power of the state we may assume that the city
in its private capacity is likewise limited. We have already noted
that the municipality in that character has rights approaching but
not equalling those of a private person engaged in a similar under-
taking. We should hardly expect to find it with greater rights in
the case of rates.
Not only is it beyond the competency of private persons to
suspend the police power, but it is a general principle that this
sovereign right cannot be permanently alienated or suspended even
by the state itself. Even though there has been no express consti-
tutional reservation of the rate-fixing power, the state may ordin-
arily resume it.' The right to regulate rates, being a portion of the
police power, is inherent in the state, and is not dependent on the
reservation of a right of alteration or repeal."
We must, however, note one important exception to the general
principle that the police power may not be alienited or suspended.
This is where the public utility and the state, or its agent, have made
a contract for a term of years, wherein it is expressly provided
that the rates there established shall not be lowered during the
period of the agreement. It has been held by the United States
Supreme Court on several occasions that the effect of such a con-
tract is to suspend during its term the power of the state to regu-
late rates so as to affect adversely the utility company." This is in
effect a suspension for that period of a portion of the police power
of the state. Since the courts have always held that the renuncia-
tion of sovereign rights must be by terms so clear and unequivocal
that there can be no doubt as to their proper construction, the sus-
411; Raymond Lumber Co. v. Raymond Light and Water Co., (I916) 92
Wash. 330, 159 Pac. 133, L. R. A. 19I7C 574; Kansas City Bolt and Nut
Co. v. Kansas City Light and Power Co., (1918) 275 Mo. 529, 204 S. W.
io74; V. and S. Bottle Co. v. Mountain Gas. Co., (1918) 261 Pa. 523, io4 At.
667; Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Public Service Corporation, (i9i9)
248 U. S. 372, 63 L. Ed. 3o9, 39 S. C. R. II7; Producer's Transportation
Co. v. R. R. Commission, (192o0) 251 U. S. 228, 64 L. Ed. 239, 40 S. C. R.
131.
'3 Dillon, Municipal Corporations 225-6.
'Ibid, p. 2226, note.
"Los Angeles v. Los Angeles City Water Co., (i899) i77 U. S. 558,
44 L. Ed. 886, 20 S. C. R. 736; Cleveland v. Cleveland City Ry. Co., (903)
194 U. S. 517, 48 L. Ed. 1102, 24 S. C. R. 756; Vicksburg v. Vicksburg
Water WVorks Co., (i9o6) 2o6 U. S. 496, 51 L. Ed. 1155, 27 S. C. R. 762.
See also an extensive note in L. R. A. 1I5C 261 on "Right to Reduce
Rates of Public Service Corporations Fixed by Franchise or Charter."
See also 12 R. C. L. iSo.
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pension of this power will not be acknowledged unless the power
and intention to suspend are clearly shown.' Only where the con-
tract is properly made, is clearly expressed, and is not ultra vires,
will it be upheld against the rate-making activities of the state or
-its agencies. Where it complies with these conditions it will be up-
held, and the public service commission must, during the term of
the agreement, be held powerless to alter the rates to the detriment
of the utility. Thfis the public service company may under certain
contracts be exenipt from the rate-making activity of the state com-
mission.
But no such exemption is recognized in the case of the munici-
pality. It is obvious that in the making of such a contract the city is
acting in its governmental character since it could not in its private
capacity suspend the operation of the rate-making power. But
agreements made by the municipal corporation in its public capacity
are subject to the will of the state, whose agent the city is. Those
who would give the municipality a contract right in rates fixed by
agreement are thus confronted with this dilemma: If the agree-
ment was made by the city in its private character, the police power
has not been suspended, and subsequent regulation is not an im-
pairment of contract. On the other hand, if the agreement was
made by the city in its governmental character so as to suspend the
operation of the power in behalf of the utility, the city holds its
rights as agent of the state which may if it desires give up the
rights so gained. In such a case where the public service com-
mission grants an increase of rates, that may be taken as indicating
an intent on the part of the state to forego whatever rate privileges
it may have gained through its agent, the city.'
It is true that the same franchise agreement may contain both
public and private provisions, .some made by the city in one capacity,
some in the other. But it is hard to conceive of the municipal
corporation as having dealt in both capacities with a single mat-
ter, such as that of rates. It is difficult to see how it could in its
governmental character make with itself in its proprietary character
an irrevocable contract as to rates. The presumption against the
suspension of the rate-making power is so strong that it can be
"Home Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles, (1908) 2H1 U. S.
265, 53 L. Ed. 176, 29 S. C. R. 50; Milwaukee Electric, etc., Co. v. Railroad
Comm., (1914) 238 U. S. 174, 59 L. Ed. 1254, 35 S. C. R. 82o.
"
9See note on "Power of Public Utility Commissions to Alter Rates of
Public Service Corporations Fixed by Contract Between the Municipality
and the Public Service Corporation" in 4 IMIINNESoTA LAW RE:vEw 526.
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overcome only by showing a clear power and intent to suspend.
The doubt surrounding the city's power and intent to grant itself
an irrevocable rate contract in its private capacity is such that it
would seem that the presumption has not been overcome. In such
cases the city can have no valid objection to subsequent rate regula-
tion by the public service commission. Thus though the municipal-
ity may have contract rights protected by the federal constitution,
an agreement for certain rates for a specified period is not to be
included among such rights.
When we turn from the problem of rates to the broader ques-
tions of regulation we may find many privileges of city and public
utility that are entitled to constitutional protection. The nature
of the city's rights has been indicated in the extract quoted from the
opinion in Chicago v. O'Connell.! The company likewise may have
been granted many private privileges. Such contract rights are held
free from an unwarranted exercise of power by the state, but are
of course subject to a proper use of the state's police power, with
the exception noted above. It is well established that the exercise
of the power must be at all times reasonable.'
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we may summarize the points considered in this
paper. The rapid rise of public utilities, and the public's depen-
dence on them, made some sort of control necessary. Many dif-
ferent methods were suggested, and several were tried. The fail-
ure of political control, and the inability of the courts to remedy
the evils of such control, led in many cases to municipal ownership
of public utilities. The commission control idea was also brought
forward and tried in both local and state commissions. It ap-
peared that exclusive state control was more desirable than exclusive
local control, and the state commission for the control of public util-
ities found rapidly increasing favor. It is possible that a division of
powers between state and city is more desirable than the exclusive
control of either, and a suggested division of powers has accord-
ingly been presented.
Connected with these problems of policy are legal questions of
great interest, especially constitutional questions in respect to the
relations of city and state where the utilities are municipally owned.
While it appears that the city in its governmental capacity is en-
titled to no protection against the state, it appears from a study of
"p. 143, supra.
3 Dillon, Municipal Corporations 2o62; 6 R. C. L. 236.
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the cases that in its proprietory capacity the city is entitled to con-
stitutional protection against the state approaching that extended
to a private person engaged in a similar undertaking. This seems
to be supported by the weight of authority, though the law cannot
be regarded as definitely settled on this point. If protection is
given the city in its proprietary undertakings, its rights in such en-
terprises must be respected by the state commission in the same
manner as that body would respect the rights of a private person
engaged in similar undertakings.
We noticed that franchises are derived from the state, whatever
may be the agency employed in granting them, and that in the
granting of pure franchise privileges the city acts in a governmen-
tal capacity. It cannot get any vested rights in the powers which
it has used in this character. However, the franchise agreement
may contain many items not governmental in their nature, and as
to them the city and company may get private rights. Privileges
of this nature, while protected against abuse of power, are gener-
ally held to be subject, as other rights are, to the police power of
the state. The fixing of rates is considered an exercise of the po-
lice power and may generally be exercised by the commission, not-
withstanding previous rate-fixing agreements. An exception to
this has been noted. Where the city plainly has been given the
power to make an irrevocable contract for rates for a term of years,
and has made a contract in which it is clearly evident that the city
intends to suspend the rate-making power for a term of years, that
contract will be upheld during its term against the rate-making
power of the state.
Granting to the city a full measure of protection in its pro-
prietary capacity, the powers of the commission are still almost as
great as before. The majority of the city's powers are held in a
governmental capacity and we have seen that as to those the power
of the state is at all times supreme. The remaining rights of the
municipality are in large measure subordinate to the police power,
so that the commission' may regulate in such matters as rates and
service. The city as owner of a business affected with a public
use can have no greater rights than a private person, and we have
noted that it may have less through the power of the state to de-
prive it of its existence and thus of its capacity to hold property.
Consequently, while the question of rights is of great importance
in particular cases, in general it will not affect in any great degree
the powers of the state commission in the control of public utilities.
